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Reflections on Motion Picture Evidence
Brian L. Frye
Film will only become an art when its materials are
as inexpensive as pencil and paper.
—Jean Cocteau.

Introduction
Courts have long admitted motion pictures as evidence. But until recently, making motion
pictures was expensive and cumbersome. Today, making motion pictures is cheap and easy.
And as a result, people make so many of them. As Cocteau predicted, the democratization of
motion pictures has enabled people to create new forms of motion picture art. But it has also
enabled people to create new forms of motion picture evidence. This article offers a brief
history of motion picture evidence in the United States, and reflects on the use of motion
picture evidence by the Supreme Court.
A Potted History of Motion Picture Evidence
Motion picture evidence is any motion picture introduced in a legal proceeding in order to
establish a fact or illustrate an argument. The idea of motion picture evidence probably
coincided with the invention of motion pictures. Among the first motion pictures were the
“actuality films” created by Auguste and Louis Lumière in 1895, each of which briefly
documented an actual event. Filmmakers soon realized that motion pictures provided a new
kind of evidence. In 1913, Edwin Thanhouser and Lawrence Marston made The Evidence of the
Film, a 15 minute melodrama that imagined the use of a motion picture film as evidence in a
trial.1 But in practice, the standard 35mm nitrate film was too expensive, unwieldy, and
dangerous for practical use in evidence gathering or presentation in court.2 Cameras were too
large to conceal, and film was explosively flammable.
Moreover, courts resisted the introduction of motion picture evidence. In 1920, a California
trial court refused to admit into evidence a motion picture re-enactment of a murder offered
by the defense, on the ground “that ‘juries are naturally prone to accept them as absolutely
correct,’ and that, therefore, they were admissible only under certain circumstances.”3 And in
1922, when a New York trial court allowed the introduction of motion picture evidence in a
tort action, the appellate court reversed, holding that motion picture evidence was not
admissible:
Aside from the fact that moving pictures present a fertile field for exaggeration of any
emotion or action, and the absence of evidence as to how this particular motion
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picture film was prepared, we think the picture admitted in evidence brought before
the jury irrelevant matter, hearsay and incompetent evidence, and tended to make a
farce of the trial.4
In 1923, Kodak introduced 16mm safety film, the first commercially successful amateur
motion picture film format. The cameras were small and reasonably priced, and the film was
both relatively inexpensive and non-flammable. Suddenly, almost anyone could make movies,
including judges.5 Most of those people made home movies. But some of them made
evidence films, or films intended for use as motion picture evidence. Law enforcement saw
the potential of evidence films in investigating and proving crimes, and lawyers saw similar
potential in civil cases.6
Soon, genres of motion picture evidence began to emerge.7 One of the first was “surveillance
films,” which provided covert documentation of criminal defendants or parties to civil
lawsuits. For example, police secretly filmed not only criminal activity, but also strikes and
political rallies, for use as evidence.8 And after the introduction of motion picture sound,
police secretly filmed interrogations in order to document confessions.9 Similarly, private
investigators secretly filmed targets in order to create motion picture evidence for use in civil
cases.10 For example, insurance investigators made “malingering” films, in which they filmed
tort plaintiffs in order to disprove claims of disability: “The advent of the miniature camera
and small motion-picture camera, particularly, has marked the end of easy money for
insurance fakers.”11 And private investigators made “philandering” films, which provided
proof of infidelity.
Tort plaintiffs eventually responded to “malingering” films with “day-in-the-life” films, which
documented how their injuries affected their lives.12 While these day-in-the-life films were
occasionally introduced as evidence at trial, often they were used as “video settlement
brochures,” to encourage defendants to settle:
The lights in the mahogany paneled conference room dim. There, projected on a 72inch screen, is a day-in-the-life video of a car accident survivor who lost her leg in the
crash. The attorneys in the room see the ugly reality of her stump, a sight she and her
family must endure for the rest of their lives. She painfully and painstakingly changes
the dressing on her oozing wound.
No words can conjure up the revulsion in the room created by the stark video. The
attorneys for the insurance company know that nothing they might say would
diminish the intense sympathy for the victim this video would generate in a jury. They
might wince at your settlement demand, but more than likely, they will agree to
settle.13
In addition, both plaintiffs and defendants created “demonstrative” films, intended to help
juries understand their theory of a case by providing a motion picture illustration. For
example, lawyers commissioned motion picture re-creations of car accidents or animated
illustrations of how a patented device works.14 Demonstrative films are not introduced as
2
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substantive evidence of a fact, but rather as demonstrative evidence, to illustrate or explain
testimony or evidence.15
The introduction of inexpensive consumer video in the 1970s enabled the widespread
creation of “testimonial” films.16 Police began to videotape interrogations and lawyers began
to videotape depositions, for use in court. Some courts even experimented with “Prerecorded Videotaped Trials” (PRVTs), in which the jury watched a movie of the testimony
and arguments, rather than live testimony. Not only did PRVTs reduce the duration of trials
by excluding extraneous information, but also they enabled judges to rule on the admissibility
of testimony and evidence outside the presence of the jury.17
Contemporary Motion Picture Evidence
Initially, evidence films were obscurities, created only by lawyers and government officials,
and shown only to a jury, if ever. But as creating motion pictures gradually became easier and
less expensive, more and more people could and did create evidence films, often
unintentionally.

The Zapruder Film
The paradigmatic evidence film is surely the 26-second 8mm home movie that Abraham
Zapruder filmed of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963. It is
probably the most thoroughly examined motion picture ever. The Warren Commission
investigation and report on the assassination, which found that Lee Harvey Oswald shot
Kennedy and acted alone, relied heavily on the Zapruder film, as did several subsequent
official investigations.18 Among other things, the Warren Commission used the Zapruder film
to help determine the trajectory of the bullets that struck Kennedy.19 Not to mention the
innumerable conspiracy theorists who have relentlessly scrutinized every frame of the film,
searching for evidence to prove their pet theory of who actually killed Kennedy and why.
Notably, the Warren Commission made 35mm enlargements of each frame of the Zapruder
film, in order to facilitate close analysis.20

The Rodney King Video
The notoriety of the Zapruder film is rivaled only by George Holliday’s video of Rodney
King being beaten by officers of the Los Angeles Police Department. At 12:30 a.m. on March
3, 1991, King was driving on the Foothill Freeway in Los Angeles with two passengers, when
officers Tim and Melanie Singer of the California Highway Patrol clocked him speeding and
initiated pursuit. King was intoxicated and refused to stop. After a high-speed chase involving
several police cars and a police helicopter, the police eventually cornered King and forced
him to stop. Soon afterward, five LAPD officers arrived on the scene: Stacey Koon, Laurence
Powell, Timothy Wind, Theodore Briseno, and Rolando Solano.
Officer Tim Singer ordered King and his passengers to leave the car and lie face down on the
ground. The passengers complied, and were beaten before being arrested. King eventually
3
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emerged from the car, laid face down on the ground, and grabbed his buttocks. Officer
Melanie Singer believed King was reaching for a weapon and ordered him to remain on the
ground.
At that point, LAPD Sergeant told the Singers that the LAPD was taking over. Koon ordered
the other four LAPD officers to manually subdue and arrest King, but King resisted and
attempted to stand. Koon then tasered King twice. At that point, King ran toward Officer
Powell and collided with him. Powell hit King with his baton, knocking him to the ground,
then hit him several more times. When Powell stopped hitting him, King again rose to his
knees. On Koon’s orders, the LAPD officers began beating King, hitting him with their
batons at least 33 times and kicking him at least 6 times. King was seriously injured by the
beating, suffering multiple fractures and brain damage.
Shortly after Koons tasered King, George Holliday began videotaping the incident from the
balcony of his nearby apartment. Holliday’s video begins with King running toward Powell
and documents King’s beating and arrest. Two days later, Holliday told the LAPD about his
video, but was ignored, so he gave it to KTLA-TV instead. KTLA broadcast Holliday’s video,
excising the blurry beginning where King runs toward Powell, and soon every television
station in the country did the same.
Holliday’s video galvanized the nation. It presented seemingly irrefutable documentary
evidence of brutal and unjustifiable violence used by the LAPD against unarmed suspects.
President Bush described the video as “sickening.” On March 14, 1991, the Los Angeles
district attorney criminally charged officers Koon, Powell, Briseno, and Wind with use of
excessive force. And in April 1991, Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley created the Independent
Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, to conduct “a full and fair examination
of the structure and operation of the LAPD.” Among other things, the Commission explicitly
recognized that there would have been no investigation without the video.21
The criminal charges were tried in nearby Ventura County before a jury that did not include
any African-American members. Ironically, the prosecution and the defense both relied on
Holliday’s video as their best evidence. While the prosecution’s strategy was to let the video
“speak for itself,” the defense’s strategy was to explain what the video meant.22 The
prosecution presented the video as simple and incontrovertible evidence of guilt. But the
defense used the video to illustrate its theory of why the LAPD officers had acted reasonably
under the circumstances, arguing that the officers had reasonably believed that King was
dangerous and used targeted force to subdue him, consistent with their training. Specifically,
the defense used slow motion and freeze-frame to examine and explain the meaning of key
events depicted in the video.23 On April 29, 1992, the jury acquitted Koon, Briseno, and
Wind, but hung on Powell. Massive riots immediately erupted in Los Angeles and other cities
across the country.
On August 4, 1992, the United States Department of Justice indicted the four officers on
federal civil rights charges for using unreasonable force and failing to stop an unlawful
assault. In the federal trial, both the prosecution and the defense used the video to illustrate
4
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their respective theories of the case. Rather than merely presenting the video, the defense also
interpreted it. On April 11, 1992, the jury convicted Koons and Powell, but acquitted Wind
and Briseno. The district court sentenced Koons and Powell to 30 months in prison, heavily
mitigating their sentences on the ground that King had resisted arrest, justifying certain uses
of force. Among other things, the district court asked what kinds of evidence the video did
and did not provide. Specifically, it observed:
Although the videotape creates a vivid impression of a violent encounter, careful
analysis shows that it is sometimes an ambiguous record of the crucial events. A
meaningful understanding of the events it depicts required the explanation of
witnesses who are experts in law enforcement.
...
Although the videotape is reliable evidence of the physical events that unfolded in the
course of Mr. King’s arrest, it provides less direct evidence concerning two factors
central to Officer Powell's illegal behavior. To determine that at any given point
Officer Powell’s behavior crossed the line into illegality, the Court must find that
Officer Powell used objectively unreasonable force, and that he intended to use
excessive force.
...
Accordingly, in evaluating the videotape, the Court must take into account the totality
of the circumstances, including facts not displayed on the tape. Mr. King had not
been searched. Mr. King did not respond to the electrical charge of Sergeant Koon’s
taser. Sergeant Koon testified that he observed Mr. King sweating profusely. At least
during the initial stages of the arrest process, Sergeant Koon may reasonably have
suspected that Mr. King was under the influence of PCP because of Mr. King’s erratic
and recalcitrant behavior.24
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s sentencing decision, holding that the district
court lacked discretion to mitigate under the sentencing guidelines, but the Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the original sentences, holding that the district
court did have discretion.25
Reactions to the Rodney King Verdicts
After the state trial, many people were surprised and incensed that none of the officers were
convicted, especially given Holliday’s damning video. Some chalked up the outcome to
racism, observing, inter alia, that the jury had no African-American members. Others argued
that the defense’s use of slow motion and freeze-frame to analyze the video had improperly
distorted reality. But as film scholar Bill Nichols observed, this objection is incoherent:
Of course, slow motion is a “distortion.” So is the raw footage. (It puts threedimensional events onto a two-dimensional surface, produces foreshortening, and
introduced problems of graininess, focus, and sound.) Any post facto account, be it
from an eyewitness, participant, prosecutor, or historian, distorts. History, which is
5
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what we must reconstruct here, is always a matter of story telling: our reconstruction
of events must impose meaning and order on them, assign motivations, assess causes,
and propose moral judgments (in this case, guilt or innocence).26
Likewise, according to Richard Sherwin, images lack intrinsic meaning, and acquire meaning
only in context:
In the end, we can say that the prosecutor’s naïve realism undid him. Contrary to his
naïve assumption, visual images do not make meaning all on their own. Visual
meaning is highly malleable. As photojournalists know, captions can turn a photo’s
intended meaning on its head. If you do not provide a context of meaning, if you do
not wrap a sequence of images in a narrative of your own, you will leave open the
possibility that their meaning will be captured by the narrative of another.27
But as film scholar Noel Carroll has observed, there is nothing epistemically unique about the
rhetoric of motion pictures:
But clearly selectivity, even if it is an inevitable feature of film, is not a unique feature
of film. Every mode of inquiry and its attendant channels of publicity - from physics
through history to journalism - is selective. So nothing special is discovered by
revealing the selectivity of the motion picture apparatus. Moreover, insofar as we do
not regard physics or history as exiled from objectivity just because they select, then
there should be no impulse to suspect the nonfiction film’s credentials, on a priori
grounds, merely because it is selective. We can’t have chemistry or economics without
selectivity. Indeed, it is their selectivity that makes them possible. Why should we
expect things to stand differently with nonfiction films?28
While it is trivially true that images lack intrinsic meaning, the same is true of any
representation, indeed any human endeavor. But contextless perception is impossible. The
people who watched the video on their televisions at home perceived it in the context of their
lived experience. The prosecutor relied on that context, believing that it supported the
narrative he wanted to convey. The problem was that the defense provided a new and
different context that undermined the prosecutor’s narrative.
As Naomi Mezey has observed, “the image cannot speak for itself.” On the contrary, images
are “open to interpretive dispute and ought to be critically examined like text or testimony.”
In light of that observation she asks:
How might prosecutors have used visual literacy to present the video or respond to
the counter-narrative? One approach would have been to mimic the defense
technique by unearthing details that supported their case or showing why the
technique itself was misleading. Another possibility would have been to speak for the
video by explaining why people were right to see it as excessive force by police.29
Of course, in the federal trial, the prosecutors did adopt their own version of the interpretive
techniques used by the defense in the state trial, to good effect. But in addition, the state
prosecutor arguably did attempt to explain why people were right to see the video as
6
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conclusively proving the use of excessive force. At least, the prosecutor’s strategy was to rely
on the jury’s intuition that beating an unarmed man could not possibly be justified. But the
defense used the same video to provide a detailed explanation of why each element of the
beating was indeed justified under the circumstances.
The underlying problem is that the question presented to the jury was not a question of fact,
but a question of law. The jury was not asked to determine the facts of what happened, which
were not meaningfully in dispute. It was asked to determine whether the officers’ actions were
reasonable under the circumstances, which is inherently a question of law.30 The video alone
could not answer that question, because it is a question of judgment, not a question about
what the video depicted.
Ultimately, the jury was not asked to determine what the video showed. It was asked to
determine what the video meant. It could have held that, as a matter of law, beating an
unarmed man is unreasonable. But it did not. For better or worse, it applied the law as argued
by the defense and instructed by the judge, and asked whether each act was unreasonable
under the circumstances, from the perspective of the police officers. When the state
prosecutor failed to offer a counter-narrative on that question, the jury found for the defense.
But when the federal prosecutor did offer a counter-narrative, the jury convicted two of the
defendants.31

Cellphone Videos
Today, motion picture evidence is ubiquitous. Police cars are equipped with dash-cams, police
officers wear body-cams, and surveillance cameras are omnipresent. But perhaps more
importantly, almost everyone routinely carries a motion picture camera in their pocket or
purse, built into their cellphones. At the merest suggestion of official misconduct, a phalanx
of cellphones emerges to document it.32 As a consequence, video evidence of police violence
has proliferated.
Unsurprisingly, the interpretive dilemma posed by Holliday’s video has persisted. Many
people watch these videos and understandably conclude that the police actions depicted are
objectively unreasonable. But courts typically see the same videos as probative evidence of
questions of fact relevant to determining the ultimate legal question of reasonableness, and
frequently reach different conclusions. Which presents the question, how should courts
evaluate the relevant and meaning of different kinds of motion picture evidence?
In the last decade, the United States Supreme Court has occasionally posted video evidence
on its official website. Currently, the Supreme Court website hosts video evidence relating to
three cases: Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Kelly v. California, 555 U.S. 1020 (2008); and
Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269 (2015).33 I will consider each in turn, describing both the
factual background of each case and the motion picture evidence in question, then examining
the Supreme Court’s interpretation and use of that motion picture evidence. I will also
describe certain motion picture collages that I created using the motion picture evidence and
7
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oral argument recordings, intended to illustrate - and hopefully illuminate - how the Supreme
Court has used and interpreted motion picture evidence.

Scott v. Harris
Ironically, the first video evidence posted on the Supreme Court website concerns another
African-American driver pursued by the police. At 10:42 p.m. on March 29, 2001, Deputy
Clinton Reynolds of the Coweta County, Georgia Sheriff’s Office clocked Victor Harris’s car
traveling at 73 miles per hour in a 55 miles-per-hour zone. Reynolds flashed the lights on his
cruiser, but Harris did not stop, so Reynolds initiated pursuit. Harris drove at speeds between
70 and 90 miles per hour, which exceeded the posted speed limit, passed other vehicles in
places where passing was not permitted, and ran two red lights. However, he used his blinkers
when passing and turning.
During the pursuit, Reynolds radioed dispatch and reported that he was pursuing a fleeing
vehicle. He did not state that he initiated the pursuit because the vehicle was speeding.
Deputy Timothy Scott of the Coweta County, Georgia Sheriff’s Office heard Reynolds’s
broadcast and joined the pursuit as Harris approached Fayette County, Georgia.
When Harris entered Peachtree City in Fayette County, he slowed down and turned into the
parking lot of a shopping complex, where two Peachtree City Police cruisers were already
stationed. Scott drove to the opposite side of the parking lot and tried to prevent Harris from
leaving the parking lot by blocking the exit. Harris drove around Scott’s cruiser, but collided
with it, damaging the cruiser. Harris then entered the highway and drove south at high speed.
Reynolds and Scott continued to pursue him.
Scott requested permission to execute a Precision Intervention Technique (“PIT”) in order to
stop Harris. A PIT is a method of stopping a vehicle by colliding with it at a specific point.
Scott had not been trained to execute a PIT. Sergeant Mark Fenninger of the Coweta County,
Georgia Sheriff’s Office authorized Scott to execute a PIT. However, Scott decided that he
could not execute a PIT because Harris was driving too fast. Instead, Scott rammed his
cruiser into Harris’s vehicle, causing Harris to lose control of his vehicle and crash. As a result
of the crash, Harris was seriously injured and rendered quadriplegic.34
On October 16, 2001, Harris filed a complaint in federal district court against Scott,
Reynolds, Fenninger, Sheriff Michael Yeager, and Coweta County. Harris alleged federal
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as state claims for violation of his
rights under the Georgia Constitution, and common law tort claims.35
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In his response to the motion, Harris
conceded that summary judgment was appropriate on his some of his claims. The district
court granted summary judgment onand dismissed some of Harris’s other claims. But it
denied summary judgment onand did not dismiss Harris’s Fourth Amendment claims against
Defendants Scott and Fenninger for the use of excessive force and the authorization of the
8
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use of excessive force; his municipal liability claim for failure to train against Coweta County;
and his negligence claim against Coweta County based on the acts of Defendants Scott and
Fenninger.36
Scott and Fenninger appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for summary
judgment of Harris’s Fourth Amendment claims against them based on qualified immunity.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of Scott’s motion for summary
judgment, but reversed the district court’s denial of Henninger’s motion for summary
judgment. The court held that Scott was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified
immunity because, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Harris, a reasonable juror
could find that Scott’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable under the
circumstances. The court specifically rejected Scott’s argument that Harris’s driving “must, as
a matter of law, be considered sufficiently reckless to give Scott probable cause to believe that
he posed a substantial threat of imminent physical harm to motorists and pedestrians,”
concluding, “This is a disputed issue to be resolved by a jury.” However, the court reversed
the district court’s denial of Henninger’s motion for summary judgment because Henninger
did not authorize Scott to ram Harris’s vehicle.37
Scott filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was granted.
The Court held oral argument on February 26, 2007, and issued an opinion written by Justice
Scalia reversing the circuit court’s denial of Scott’s motion for summary judgment on April
30, 2007. Specifically, the Court held, “The car chase that respondent initiated in this case
posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others; no reasonable jury
could conclude otherwise. Scott’s attempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off
the road was reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judgment.” It based its holding on
two videos of the pursuit, recorded by cameras installed in Reynolds and Scott’s cruisers,
stating that no reasonable juror could have believed that Harris was not “driving in such
fashion as to endanger human life.”38 The majority opinion also attached the videos of the
pursuit.39
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concurred, arguing that Scott’s actions were reasonable under
the circumstances. Both Ginsburg and Breyer specifically objected to the adoption of a per se
rule that it is reasonable for a law enforcement officer to use deadly force against a motorist
who is endangering the public. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that a reasonable juror could
find that Scott’s actions were unreasonable under the circumstances.40
Reactions to Scott v. Harris
Many scholars and commentators criticized the Court’s decision in Scott v. Harris, typically
arguing that it had improperly reversed the circuit court because Harris presented a question
of disputed fact that should have been decided by a jury: were Scott’s actions reasonable
under the circumstances?41
Perhaps most notably, Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman published an
article in the Harvard Law Review arguing that the Court’s reasoning was incorrect, based on
9
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an empirical study showing that different people could and did have different opinions about
the reasonableness of Scott’s actions.42 Their study asked 1,350 people from a diversity of
backgrounds a series of questions intended to determine whether they thought Scott’s actions
were reasonable under the circumstances. The results showed that while the majority of the
survey participants agreed that Scott’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances, some
of the survey participants disagreed, and that people from certain social groups were more or
less likely to believe that Scott’s actions were reasonable.
The article argued that the survey showed that the Court’s conclusion in Scott v. Harris was
based on “cognitive illiberalism,” a form of unconscious bias that prevented most of the
Justices from perceiving the videos from the perspective of diverse social groups. And it
argues that this “cognitive illiberalism” may decrease the “democratic legitimacy” of the
Court’s decisions. While the Court saw Scott’s actions as obviously reasonable, it failed to
realize that others might disagree. Indeed, as the article emphasizes, Justice Stevens’s dissent
rejects the majority’s conclusion that Scott’s actions were reasonable.
The article was quite influential, and led many scholars to conclude that the Court’s decision
was incorrect. The problem is that the Kahan study may not have asked the question that the
Court actually answered. Unfortunately, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Scott v. Harris is arguably
ambiguous about the basis for its outcome. The study assumes that the Court reversed the
circuit court on the ground that, based on the videos, no reasonable juror could find that
Scott’s actions were unreasonable under the circumstances. And it provides convincing
evidence that at least some reasonable jurors could find that Scott’s actions were
unreasonable under the circumstances.
But the Court may actually have reversed the circuit court on the ground that, based on the
videos, no reasonable juror could find that Harris’s actions were not dangerous, and that
police officers who use deadly force to stop dangerous drivers are entitled to qualified
immunity.43 This reading of Scott v. Harris is consistent with the Court’s ultimate holding:
The car chase that respondent initiated in this case posed a substantial and immediate
risk of serious physical injury to others; no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.
Scott’s attempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the road was
reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judgment.44
And it is bolstered by the concurring opinions of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, both of
whom explicitly stated their opposition to the adoption of a per se rule that police officers who
use deadly force against dangerous drivers are entitled to qualified immunity.45
In other words, the Court seems to have adopted a per se rule that police officers who use
deadly force against dangerous drivers are entitled to qualified immunity. And it concluded,
based on the videos, that Harris was objectively driving dangerously, because he was
speeding, passing when not permitted, and running red lights. One can certainly disagree with
the wisdom of adopting such a per se rule. Perhaps the law should require police to use deadly
force more judiciously by empowering jurors to evaluate the reasonableness of their actions
10
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under the circumstances. And one can certainly disagree with the Court’s assumption that
speeding, passing when not permitted, and running red lights qualify as “dangerous” driving.
But if they do, it is hard to see how a reasonable juror could find that Harris was not “driving
dangerously,” because the videos conclusively establish that he was speeding, passing when
not permitted, and running red lights. While the videos cannot determine whether Scott’s
actions were reasonable, they can determine certain facts about what happened.
Indeed, the authors of the Kahan study later acknowledged that they did not ask the question
posed by the Court - whether the videos showed that Harris was driving dangerously - but
rather asked the question the Court “should” have asked - whether the videos showed that
Harris was driving sufficiently dangerously to justify Scott’s actions:
Because Justice Scalia, on the basis of the video and the background facts of the case,
concluded that Harris, the fleeing driver, was entirely at fault, we asked our subjects to
indicate agreement or disagreement with the statement that the decision to pursue
Harris wasn’t worth the risk to the public, and also to apportion fault for risk between
Harris and the police. We also asked our subjects to state their level of agreement or
disagreement with the proposition (the outcome of the case, essentially) that use of
deadly force to terminate the chase was warranted in light of the risk that Harris’s
driving posed to the public and the police. As Orin notes, we found, again, that a
majority took positions consistent with that of the Scott majority, although on these
issues there was even sharper dissent among demographically and culturally defined
groups.
It’s true, as Orin notes and as we discuss in the paper, that these issues wouldn’t be
submitted to a jury under the apparent, bright-line rule that Justice Scalia announced:
“A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed chase that threatens
the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when
it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” 127 S. Ct. at 1779. But
Justice Scalia’s justification for such a rule was that there was only one reasonable way
to assess the balance of risks in a case like Scott. We wanted to find out whether
ordinary people—whose judgments presumably are part of the reasonableness
calculus—would agree. Our finding that in fact members of diverse subcommunities
balance the risks differently (from one another and from the Court majority) raises
the normative question whether the Court should have formulated a test that bars a
jury from considering this matter.46
The Kahan study convincingly showed that, based on the videos, reasonable jurors could
disagree about whether Scott’s actions were reasonable. But it did not necessarily show that
reasonable jurors could disagree about whether Harris was driving dangerously, at least
insofar as “driving dangerously” is given an objective definition consistent with Harris’s
actions as documented in the videos.
Perhaps the Court adopted the wrong legal rule. Perhaps juries should determine holistically
whether a police officer’s decision to use deadly force against a dangerous driver was
11
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reasonable. And perhaps allowing them to do so would increase the political legitimacy of
liability determinations.
But it seems odd to conclude that the Court’s conclusion in Scott v. Harris was the product of
unconscious bias, if it intentionally adopted a per se rule that police officers who use deadly
force against dangerous drivers are entitled to qualified immunity. While the Court may have
adopted the wrong rule, it did so quite consciously.
And its application of that rule seems clearly correct. The videos conclusively establish that
Harris’s driving was objectively “dangerous,” and the Kahan study provides no evidence to
the contrary. It only shows that reasonable people could disagree about whether Harris’s
driving was sufficiently dangerous to justify Scott’s actions. Notably, Justice Stevens’s dissent
effectively conceded that Harris’s driving was dangerous, but argued that it was insufficiently
dangerous to justify Scott’s actions.
In a similar vein, Naomi Mezey argued that “the Scott majority displayed a pronounced visual
illiteracy” by “assuming that the video showed them precisely what they were looking for.”47
Specifically, she noted that the Court failed to consider the perspective from which the videos
were filmed, which may have increased the perception of danger. And it did not consider
relevant facts not documented in the video relating to the relative dangerousness of the car
chase. “For all the video shows, it does not provide much evidence about ‘the circumstances’
from which courts are to determine reasonableness.”48
Mezey is quite correct that the Court did not consider many facts relevant to the relative
dangerousness of Harris’s actions. And the Court also did not consider the perspective from
which the video was filmed. But perhaps the Court did not think those questions were
relevant to its legal conclusion? If the legal question before the Court was whether Harris was
“driving dangerously,” and “driving dangerously” is defined as, inter alia, speeding, passing
when not permitted, and running red lights, then perhaps the Court considered those
questions simply irrelevant. The video documented certain facts. If those facts were sufficient
to show that Harris was “driving dangerously” as a matter of law, then the Court was correct
to grant summary judgment, because there was nothing for a jury to decide.
Of course, that is not to say that the Court’s adopted the right legal rule. Perhaps the question
of “dangerousness” should always be a holistic question decided by the jury. And perhaps the
Court adopted an overly mechanical standard for “dangerous driving.” But these are
normative questions about the proper standard of care to apply to police and citizens, and
structural questions about the respective roles of the court and the jury, not questions of fact
about what the video did or didn’t show. Again, it seems that the disputed question is not
about what the video proved, but what it meant. That is not a question for the video to
answer, but for its viewer.
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A Reasonable Man
My movie A Reasonable Man combines the videos at issue in Scott v. Harris with excerpts from
the oral argument before the Supreme Court.49 It encourages viewers to consider the Court’s
description of the videos in relation to the videos themselves. Specifically, it asks viewers to
consider how the Supreme Court interpreted the videos and how the videos affected the
Court’s decision. Should the Court have adopted a bright line rule that it is reasonable for a
police officer to use deadly force to stop a fleeing motorist who is driving dangerously? Did
the Court correctly find that the videos provided conclusive evidence that Harris was driving
dangerously? Or should the Court have permitted a jury to make those determinations?
Victim Impact Evidence
Historically, the United States and the overwhelming majority of states permitted courts to
impose capital punishment on criminal defendants for a variety of crimes, including murder
and rape. In Furman v. Georgia (1972), the Supreme Court narrowly held that capital
punishment violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment,”
in a fractured opinion.50 In Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court reversed itself, holding that
capital punishment for first degree murder did not violate the Eighth Amendment, so long as
capital trials are bifurcated into separate guilt and penalty phases.51
In the guilt phase of a capital trial, the jury determines whether the defendant is guilty of a
capital crime, and in the penalty phase, it determines whether capital punishment is justified,
under the circumstances. During the penalty phase, the jury may consider, inter alia, both
mitigating and aggravating evidence relating to the defendant’s culpability.
The penalty phase was intended to enable defense lawyers to present mitigating evidence
relating to the defendant’s character or circumstances, in order to convince the jury not to
impose capital punishment. But prosecutors and victims’ rights advocates soon asked courts
for permission to present “victim impact evidence,” or evidence relating to the effect of the
crime on the victim, the victim’s family, and the community.
In Booth v. Maryland (1987), the Court held that the introduction of victim impact evidence
during the penalty phase of a capital trial violated the Eighth Amendment, because it was
irrelevant to the sentencing decision.52 And in South Carolina v. Gathers (1991), it reaffirmed
Booth, holding that the introduction of any evidence relating to the victim’s character violated
the Eighth Amendment.53
But in Payne v. Tennessee (1991), the Court reversed itself and held that the introduction of
victim impact evidence did not violate the Eighth Amendment.54 According to the Court, “In
the majority of cases, and in this case, victim impact evidence serves entirely legitimate
purposes. In the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders
the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides a mechanism for relief.”55 And it specifically observed that allowing the admission of
13
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mitigating evidence, but not victim impact evidence, was unfair to the state, because it
prevented the introduction of evidence relevant to the jury’s determination of the appropriate
punishment.56
After Payne, the Court offered no further guidance on how to evaluate the admissibility of
victim impact evidence. Different states adopted different rules relating to victim impact
evidence, and many states began to permit the introduction of many different kinds of victim
impact evidence, including victim impact videos.57
Opponents of victim impact evidence argue that it should be excluded because its emotional
appeal reduces the legitimacy of the criminal justice system by distorting the jury’s
decisionmaking process and creating an unavoidable risk of improper discrimination among
victims.58 Specifically, the admissibility of victim impact evidence may encourage juries to
punish criminals who harm certain kinds of people more harshly than criminals who harm
other kinds of people. For example, victim impact evidence relating to the murder of a child
may have more emotional impact on a jury than victim impact evidence relating to the
murder of a mentally ill adult.
By contrast, proponents of victim impact evidence argue that it increases the legitimacy of
criminal justice system by enabling the jury to better understand the social harm caused by a
crime.59 The criminal law is not an abstraction. It inevitably addresses the experiences of both
defendants and victims. And victim impact evidence enables the jury to better understand the
actual consequences of a defendant’s criminal acts.

Kelly v. California
In 1993, Sara Nokomis Weir was 19 years old. She lived in Burbank and worked at Warner
Brothers Studios. In her spare time, she went to the gym, where she met Douglas Oliver
Kelly. Eventually, she hired Kelly as her personal trainer, and they became friends.
Kelly lived with his girlfriend Michelle and her 10-year-old son Eric in Michelle’s North
Hollywood apartment. On August 30, 1993, Michelle discovered that another woman had
visited the apartment. When Kelly returned to the apartment, she locked him out, but he
kicked open the door and assaulted her. The next day, Michelle called the police. Kelly was
arrested and spent the night in prison. Michelle obtained a restraining order and moved in
with her sister. Her landlord changed the locks on her apartment, but Kelly climbed onto the
balcony and broke into Michelle’s apartment.
Weir spent the Labor Day weekend with her adoptive mother, Martha Farwell. On September
7, Weir called in sick to work, explaining that a friend had committed suicide. She was never
heard from again. Robert Coty managed an apartment building across the street from
Michelle’s apartment. Shortly after Labor Day, Coty saw Kelly “dominating” a naked woman
in Michelle’s apartment.
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On September 15, Michelle and Eric returned to their apartment. Eric discovered Weir’s
decomposing body under his bed. She was naked and wrapped in a blanket. She had been
stabbed 29 times with a pair of scissors. A plastic bag covered her head and was taped around
her neck. Eric’s baseball helmet was stuck on her head, over the bag. Kelly’s fingerprints were
everywhere. Kelly disappeared. But on November 24, he was arrested at the United StatesMexico border, attempting to re-enter the United States. He had in his possession forged
checks belonging to Weir. Later, Weir’s car was found in Mexico.
Kelly was tried in California state court for first-degree murder, with special circumstances of
robbery and rape. During the guilt phase of Kelly’s trial, the court admitted evidence that he
had defrauded or raped several different women. During the penalty phase, the court
admitted victim impact evidence, including a victim impact video prepared by Farwell. The
video consisted primarily of photographs and videos of Weir’s life. It was narrated by Farwell,
and accompanied by music written and performed by Enya, Weir’s favorite musician.
Kelly did not introduce any evidence during the guilt or penalty phases of his trial.60
The jury found Kelly guilty and sentenced him to death. On appeal, Kelly argued, inter alia,
that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the victim impact video, because it was
too long and too emotional, especially because it included irrelevant elements like the Enya
soundtrack. The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court judgment, concluding that
the trial court properly admitted the victim impact video. It concluded:
Most of the videotape was factual, relevant, and not unduly emotional, and the trial
court had discretion to admit it. To the extent it contained aspects that were
themselves emotional without being factual—the background music and the final
portion, perhaps—we are confident that permitting the jury to view and hear those
portions along with the rest of the mostly factual and relevant videotape was harmless
in light of the trial as a whole. These days, background music in videotapes is very
common; the soft music here would not have had a significant impact on the jury.61
Kelly filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the
admission of the victim impact video was so unduly prejudicial that it violated his rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court denied Kelly’s
petition. Justices Breyer and Stevens voted to grant the petition, and Justice Stevens issued a
statement objecting the Court’s denial of the petition.62
Justice Stevens provided a brief history of victim impact evidence, observing that the Court
had initially prohibited the introduction of victim impact evidence, but later reversed itself,
and began permitting it, so long as it was not “unduly prejudicial.” He further observed:
Victim impact evidence is powerful in any form. But in each of these cases, the
evidence was especially prejudicial. Although the video shown to each jury was
emotionally evocative, it was not probative of the culpability or character of the
offender or the circumstances of the offense. Nor was the evidence particularly
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probative of the impact of the crimes on the victims’ family members: The pictures
and video footage shown to the juries portrayed events that occurred long before the
respective crimes were committed and that bore no direct relation to the effect of
crime on the victims’ family members.
Equally troubling is the form in which the evidence was presented. As these cases
demonstrate, when victim impact evidence is enhanced with music, photographs, or
video footage, the risk of unfair prejudice quickly becomes overwhelming. While the
video tributes at issue in these cases contained moving portrayals of the lives of the
victims, their primary, if not sole, effect was to rouse jurors’ sympathy for the victims
and increase jurors’ antipathy for the capital defendants. The videos added nothing
relevant to the jury’s deliberations and invited a verdict based on sentiment, rather
than reasoned judgment.63
Justice Stevens also attached the victim impact video at issue to his statement.64 Kelly remains
on death row at San Quentin.
Reactions to Kelly v. California
Unsurprisingly, opponents of victim impact evidence argued that the victim impact video was
“unduly emotional,” and supporters of victim impact evidence disagreed. The dispute hinged
on whether the use of background music makes a victim impact video “unduly emotional.”
Many felt it did. As Bennett Capers observed, music affects decisions by provoking inchoate
and involuntary emotional responses:
Music does more than heighten the emotion experienced by listeners. Even
“background” music is not really in the background. It is an independent component
that not only affects the body; it is a way of knowing that can induce collective action.
In a way we have yet to fully comprehend, music, through its emotive power, can tell
a listener how the story should end. Whether a life should end. And it does this
without language. No court stenographer can record what the music said. Even an
audio recording marked as an exhibit and preserved as part of the record on appeal is
likely inadequate since any listening will fail to capture music’s collective effect, that
in-the-moment effect. This effect, even without language, has its say. This effect, even
without language, adds to the mix of thoughts jurors have. This effect, even without
language, can say vote yes. Vote death.65
But the doctrinal disagreement is essentially tactical.66 The underlying theoretical dispute goes
to the purpose of the sentencing phase. Opponents of victim impact evidence see the
sentencing phase of a capital trial as an opportunity for the defendant to introduce mitigating
evidence intended to convince the jury not to impose capital punishment. By contrast,
supporters of victim impact evidence see the sentencing phase as also an opportunity for the
prosecutor to introduce evidence of the impact of the crime on the victim and the
community. In both cases, the relevant evidence is necessarily emotional. It must appeal to
the jury’s feelings about the appropriate punishment under the circumstances. The question
16
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is, which feelings should matter? Should the sentencing consider only the relative culpability
of the defendant in the abstract? Or should it consider the social impact of the defendant’s
crime as well?
The oddity of the doctrinal standard is that it asks courts to determine whether a victim
impact video is “unduly emotional,” when the entire point of a victim impact video is to
appeal to the jury’s emotions. In other words, the doctrinal standard implies that ineffective
victim impact videos are probably admissible, but effective victim impact videos are not. That
cannot be right. If the kinds of emotions provoked by victim impact videos are relevant to
the jury’s decision, then they should be admissible, irrespective of how much emotion they
provoke. But if those emotions are not relevant, then the videos should not be admissible,
even if they are ineffective.

Sara Nokomis Weir
My movie Sara Nokomis Weir combines the victim impact video at issue in Kelly v. California
with excerpts from the oral argument before the California Supreme Court.67 It asks viewers
to consider the court’s description of the video in relation to the video itself. And it
encourages viewers to consider how the video affected the court’s decision. What is the
purpose of asking the jury to impose the sentence? Is this the kind of evidence the jury
should consider in deciding what sentence to impose? Is the court asking the right questions?
As film scholar Jaimie Baron has observed:
[I]t imposes a “reparatory gaze,” that seeks to redress a possible wrong. Although
Frye’s film does not take an explicit stance vis-à-vis the legality or ethics of the victim
impact video, I suggest that by pointing out the inability for the court to adequately
discuss the video, the film implies that the legal system may require revision. Frye’s
film thus attempts to reestablish an ethical gaze over and above the one solicited by
the victim impact video, one which asks us whether this is the kind of “evidence” we
wish to allow a jury to see when a human life is at stake.68

Brumfield v. Cain
Shortly after midnight on January 7, 1993, Kevan Brumfield murdered Corporal Betty
Smothers of the Baton Rouge Police Department. At the time, Smothers was off-duty,
working her second job as a uniformed security officer for a local grocery store. Smothers
drove the assistant manager of the grocery store, Kimen Lee, to a local bank in her police
cruiser, in order to make the store’s nightly deposit. When Smothers and Lee arrived at the
bank, Brumfield and his accomplice, Henri Broadway, opened fire. Brumfield shot Smothers
five times in the forearm, chest, and head with a .380 caliber handgun. Lee also received
multiple gunshot wounds, but managed to drive the cruiser to a local convenience store for
help. Emergency responders took Smothers and Lee to the hospital, where Smothers was
pronounced dead on arrival. Lee survived and described Broadway to the police.69
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On January 11, 1993, the police arrested Brumfield for Smothers’s murder. After several
hours of interrogation, he eventually provided a videotaped confession. In 1995, Brumfield
was tried in Louisiana court, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death.
During the trial, Brumfield introduced some evidence of intellectual disability. In 1998,
Brumfield appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction, and the
United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari.70
In 2000, Brumfield filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Louisiana state court, alleging
that he was ineligible for capital punishment based on insanity. In 2002, the United States
Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia that the execution of “mentally retarded” criminal
defendants violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of “cruel and unusual
punishments.”71 Brumfield amended his petition to claim intellectual disability and request an
Atkins hearing, based on:
1) his IQ score, obtained prior to trial, of 75; 2) his slow progress in school; 3) his
premature birth; 4) his treatment at multiple psychiatric hospitals; 5) various
medications he was prescribed; and 6) testimony that he exhibited slower responses
than “normal babies,” suffered from seizures, and was hospitalized for months after
his birth.72
On October 23, 2003, the court denied Brumfield’s request for an Atkins hearing to
determine intellectual disability. Brumfield filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Louisiana
Supreme Court, which was also denied.
On November 4, 2004, Brumfield filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court,
alleging that Louisiana improperly denied his request for an Atkins hearing. In 2010, the
federal court held an Atkins hearing, and in 2012, it enjoined the State of Louisiana from
executing Brumfield on the ground that he was “mentally retarded.”73 The State appealed, and
the circuit court reversed, on the ground that the district court improperly failed to defer to
the Louisiana state court’s decision to deny Brumfield’s petition for an Atkins hearing.74
Brumfield filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which
was granted. The case was argued before the Court on March 30, 2015. As per his usual
practice, Justice Thomas was silent during the oral argument. On June 18, 2015, the Court
vacated the circuit court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The majority
opinion was written by Justice Sotomayor and held that the state court’s refusal to grant
Brumfield’s request for an Atkins hearing was unreasonable because he had introduced
enough evidence to create a “reasonable doubt” of intellectual disability.75
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that Brumfield failed to
provide clear and convincing evidence of intellectual disability and that the majority
improperly failed to defer to the state court’s determination of fact that Brumfield was not
intellectually disabled.76 He also attached the video of Brumfield’s confession.77
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In addition, Justice Thomas reflected on Brumfield’s actions in relation to the actions of
Smothers’s children. Specifically, he noted that when Smothers died, her teenage son Warrick
Dunn acted as the parent of his younger siblings. Dunn eventually joined the National
Football League, playing for the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and Atlanta Falcons, and continued
to care for his siblings. He is also active in philanthropy, founding charitable organizations in
his mother’s name to provide free grief counseling services to children in the Baton Rouge
area, among other things.78
On Reasonableness
My movie “On Reasonableness” combines the video of Brumfield’s confession with excerpts
from the United States Supreme Court oral argument in Brumfield v. Cain.79 It allows viewers
to compare the statements of fact about Brumfield’s intellectual capacity made by the lawyers
representing Brumfield and the State of Louisiana to the motion picture evidence of
Brumfield’s behavior when he confessed to murdering Smothers. It also encourages viewers
to reflect on whether that comparison affects their perception of the relative strength of the
legal arguments presented by Brumfield and the State of Louisiana, or the majority and
dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court.
Finally, it asks viewers to consider why Justice Thomas, who typically refrains from speaking
during oral arguments, chose to speak in this case through the attachment of motion picture
evidence to his dissent. Why did he want people to watch the video of Brumfield’s
confession? Why did he think it was relevant to Brumfield’s intellectual disability claim? And
what does it actually show? Does this video provide any relevant information about
Brumfield’s intellectual capacity? If so, how can and should it be used?
Conclusion
The history of motion picture evidence is closely tied to the history of amateur cinema. As
the difficulty and expense of making motion pictures decreased, the quantity of motion
picture evidence increased. Today, we are awash in motion picture evidence. While courts
have long admitted and relied on motion picture evidence, its public visibility has increased,
as people have created and courts have received more motion picture evidence of different
kinds. Even the Supreme Court has begun to share motion picture evidence as exhibits to its
opinions, in order to illustrate its reasoning. Reflecting on when and why the Court has used
and shared motion picture evidence may illuminate the different ways in which motion
picture evidence informs and shapes legal reasoning and rhetoric.

Brian L. Frye is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky College of Law. His
scholarship focuses on intellectual property, charity law, and art law. He is also an essayist and artist of
no particular distinction.
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